Ephesians 4:15

Being True/Trustworthy

"I, Myself am the truth"

ἀληθεύοντες (from ἀληθεύω) is often translated “speaking the truth,” but this rendering is reductive. The verb, though rare in classical Greek, encompasses a broader semantic range than verbal truth-telling. It more precisely means “being true” or “practicing truth”—that is, living in alignment as an agent of truth, without deceit, trustworthy.

The scholars could not help but amend qualifiers:

"From alethes; to be true (in doctrine and profession)" (Strong's Exhaustive)

“to act in accordance with the truth, to be truthful” (BDAG, emp. add.)

 “to profess the truth (true doctrine)” (Thayer)

or awkward verbalization:

"alētheúō (literally, "truthing").../alētheúō (literally, "to truth")" (HELPS)

And thus the primary meaning of being true was effectively covered up.

The participial form here denotes a habitual, ongoing disposition rather than a single verbal act. In the context of Ephesians 4:15, especially in contrast to the deceitful instability and gambling described in v.14 (κυβείᾳ, πλάνῃ), it is best understood as denoting a life marked by trustworthiness in every respect, carried out ἐν ἀγάπῃ (“in love”). Thus, the phrase implies not merely telling the truth lovingly, but embodying truth within love—a moral-existential orientation rather than a verbal utterance alone.

Aristotle’s Use of ἀληθεύω

In Aristotle, ἀληθεύω does not simply mean “to speak the truth” in the colloquial sense, but rather denotes a correspondence between thought (or speech) and reality. This usage is foundational to his correspondence theory of truth.

1. Truth in Judgment and Proposition

Aristotle defines truth (ἀλήθεια) and falsity (ψεῦδος) primarily in terms of propositions (φάσεις) and their correspondence to reality.

In Metaphysics Θ.10 (1051b3–5), he writes:

"ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διῃρημένον οἰόμενος διῃρῆσθαι, ἔψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων."
“He is true who thinks that what is divided is divided; and he is false who thinks that what is united is divided.”

This is a paradigmatic formulation of truth as correspondence: the subject "ἀληθεύει" (is true) not because he speaks or asserts something, but because his judgment corresponds to the actual state of affairs.

2. Neutrality of Assertion and Negation

In Metaphysics Θ.10 (1062a25), Aristotle asserts:

"ὁ λέγων ἄνθρωπον ἢ οὐκ ἄνθρωπον οὐθὲν μᾶλλον ἀληθεύσει."
“He who says ‘man’ or ‘not-man’ will not be any more truthful than the other.”

Here, Aristotle emphasizes that neither affirmation nor negation is intrinsically more likely to be true; truth lies in correct correspondence, not grammatical form.

3. ἀληθεύεσθαι (Passive/Middle Voice) in Logical Contexts

In De Interpretatione (Int. 22b2), Aristotle uses the passive/middle form:

"ἀληθεύεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ."
“To be made true of the same subject.”

This construction is often used when referring to propositions or categories: something is said truly of a subject when it belongs essentially or accidentally to that subject. This reflects truth as predicative accuracy.

Summary of Aristotle's Semantic Nuance

• ἀληθεύειν (active): to judge, assert, or think in accordance with reality.

• ἀληθεύεσθαι (passive/middle): for something (a statement, predicate, etc.) to be made true of a subject—used in logical analysis.

• Not merely “telling the truth” but epistemic accuracy, ontological correspondence, or logical validity.

• Contrast with ψεύδομαι (to be false), which similarly denotes error in judgment or assertion, not merely intentional deception.